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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2007, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” 
or “Board”) faced a novel problem: how could the Board continue 
operating with only two members?1 At that time, the Board had four 
members; however, two members had terms expiring at the end of the 
year.2 When their terms expired, the Board would lose its three-
member quorum,3 effectively stopping operations until the Board had 
at least three members.4 To avoid this outcome, the Board used 
Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“Section 3(b)”) to 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2006, Michigan State University. 
1 Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
2 Board Members Since 1935, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/board/ 
board_members_since_1935.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). 
3 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
4 Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
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delegate its decision-making authority to a three-member panel.5 
Section 3(b) states: 
                                                
 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or 
more members any or all of the powers which it may itself 
exercise. . . . A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right 
of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the 
Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members 
shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to 
the first sentence hereof.6 
 
The Board believed that delegating its authority to a three-
member panel would subject the panel to a smaller, two-member 
quorum.7 Therefore, when the third member’s term expired, the 
remaining two-member panel could continue deciding cases.8 In 
effect, the Board thought that this delegation would allow the Board to 
operate as a two-member panel.9 Based on this interpretation, the two-
member panel has gone on to issue hundreds of decisions and orders.10  
On May 1, 2009, the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia 
Circuit issued decisions on the two-member panel’s legal authority to 
decided cases.11 Generally, the two Circuits determined whether the 
two-member panel could issue decisions under Section 3(b).12 
Although the same statutory provision and relevant facts were at issue, 
 
5 Id. at 8. 
6 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b). 
7 See Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
8 See New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 Compare id. at 848 (holding two-member panel had the authority to issue 
decisions), with Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 476 (holding two-member 
panel did not have the authority to issue decisions). 
12 E.g., New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845. 
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the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit reached opposite 
conclusions.13  
The courts arrived at their holdings based on two separate 
statutory arguments.14 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit decided 
whether the Board could establish a three-member panel when the 
third member was merely a sham member—a member who would 
never decide cases with the panel.15 According to the Seventh Circuit, 
the Board could create such a panel, so long as the Board initially 
delegated its power to at least three active Board members.16 Because 
the Board initially created a three-member panel, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the two-member panel’s authority to decide cases.17 In effect, 
the Seventh Circuit found that the sham member did not affect the 
legality of Board’s delegation under Section 3(b).18  
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit determined whether a two-member 
panel could decide cases after the Board lost its three-member 
quorum.19 The D.C. Circuit held that, under Section 3(b), neither the 
Board nor any delegated panel can act when the Board has less than 
three total members.20 Effectively, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Section 
3(b) as requiring three total Board members before any decision can 
be issued.21 Because the Board had only two members, the two-
member panel could not issue decisions.22 
                                                 
13 Compare id. at 848 (holding two-member panel had the authority to issue 
decisions), with Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 476 (holding two-member 
panel did not have the authority to issue decisions). 
14 Compare New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848 (deciding whether the Board 
could delegate its authority to what is effectively a two-member panel), with Laurel 
Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 476 (deciding whether the two-member panel could 
operate when the Board failed to satisfy its three member quorum requirement). 
15 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845. 
16 Id. at 845–46. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. 
20 Id. at 472–76. 
21 Id. at 472–73. 
22 Id. at 476. 
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While the distinction between these two decisions is subtle, 
recognizing the difference is critical to understanding the recent line of 
cases interpreting Section 3(b). Broadly stated, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the Board’s initial delegation,23 while the D.C. Circuit 
addressed the panel’s ability to decide cases after Board lost its 
quorum.24 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit decided whether the Board 
could delegate decision-making authority to what was effectively a 
two-member panel,25 while the D.C. Circuit decided whether the two-
member panel could decide cases after the Board lost its three-member 
quorum.26  
Not only does each issue require a separate interpretation, but the 
Seventh Circuit has not even determined whether Section 3(b) allows a 
two-member panel to act when the Board has only two members.27 
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit has not precluded a future challenge 
to the two-member panel’s authority based on this argument.28 
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit is not the only court that has decided 
whether the two-member panel could act after the Board lost its three-
member quorum.29 In fact, the Second Circuit held that, even though 
the Board had only two members, Section 3(b) did not preclude the 
two-member panel from issuing decisions.30 The Second and D.C. 
Circuits’ conflicting interpretations have further increased the 
uncertainty surrounding Section 3(b) and the two-member panel.  
With a growing trend of uncertainty, one thing is clear: definitive 
resolution to Section 3(b)’s ambiguity is needed. Without a certain 
answer, the Board, the two-member panel and hundreds of NLRB 
                                                 
23 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845–46 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
24 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. 
25 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845–46. 
26 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d 469, 472–73. 
27 See New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845–46 (not addressing whether the 
panel can act when the Board has two total members). 
28 See id. at 845. 
29 E.g., Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419–24 (2d Cir. 2009). 
30 Id. 
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decisions remain in doubt.31 As long as uncertainty remains, the Board 
appears content to avoid deciding its most contentious cases.32 This 
combination of uncertainty and inaction threatens labor relations 
across the United States.33 
Fortunately, the Board’s uncertainty will soon be resolved, as the 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether the 
current Board can decide cases under Section 3(b).34 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court must carefully review Section 3(b) to avoid reaching 
an incomplete or unsatisfying decision. To avoid such a result, the 
Supreme Court should apply Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource 
Defense Council, Inc., which offers a legal framework that both 
embraces Section 3(b)’s ambiguity and establishes a satisfying 
outcome.35 Under Chevron, the Supreme Court would first determine 
whether Section 3(b) precisely answers the question presented.36 As 
this article argues, however, Section 3(b) does not precisely answer 
either argument that has been raised. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
would proceed to Chevron step-two where they defer to the Board’s 
interpretation, as long as the interpretation is reasonable.37 This article 
will also show that the Board’s interpretation is reasonable, and thus 
that the Supreme Court should defer to the Board’s interpretation. In 
other words, Chevron analysis allows the Supreme Court to uphold the 
two-member panel’s authority to decide cases under Section 3(b). 
This article begins by exploring the Board’s origins, as well as the 
Board’s subsequent legislative codification and amendments. Next, 
this article will discuss the recent Circuit decisions interpreting 
Section 3(b) by analyzing each decision’s issues, legal reasoning and 
                                                 
31 Sam Hananel, Gridlocked NLRB Puts Off Notable Labor-Law Cases, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 26, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/ 
lifestyles/health_med_fit/article/I-NLRB0903_20090924-231810/295413/. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 
08-1457). 
35 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
36 Id. at 842–43. 
37 Id. at 843. 
 225
5
Murphy: The Seventh Circuit Giveth, and the District of Columbia Circuit
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
outcome. Finally, this article contends that a satisfying decision cannot 
rest solely on Section 3(b)’s plain language and legislative history. 
Instead, this article will demonstrate how Chevron analysis provides a 
legal framework that embraces Section 3(b)’s ambiguity, yet provides 
a satisfying outcome. 
 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
 
A. The National Industrial Recovery Act:  
The National Labor Board 
 
As part of the New Deal initiative, Congress enacted the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”)38 to spur economic recovery 
through fair trade practices and public works projects.39 To encourage 
fair trade practices, Section 7(a) of the NIRA (“Section 7(a)”)40 sought 
to “democratize” labor by giving employees the right to collectively 
                                                 
38 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, §§ 1–10, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) 
declared unconstitutional by Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 U.S. 495 
(1935). 
39 National Industrial Recovery Act §1 (“A national emergency productive of 
widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate 
and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of 
living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist.”). 
40 The NIRA states: 
 
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, 
prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the following 
conditions: (1) That employees shall have the right to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
shall be free from the interference restraint, or coercion of employers of 
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; [and] (2) that no employee 
and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of 
employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, 
organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing[.]  
§7(a). 
 
 226
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
bargain with their employers.41 Specifically, the NIRA prohibited 
employers from requiring employees to join a specific union, 
including employer-run unions, as a condition of employment.42 The 
NIRA drafters believed that regulating collective bargaining would 
improve employee bargaining power, which would then result in 
increased purchasing power and standards of living.43 
However, Section 7(a) failed to protect employees from employer 
coercion.44 To begin, the National Recovery Administration (“NRA”), 
the agency that administered the NIRA, did not strictly enforce 
Section 7(a)’s prohibitions.45 Additionally, employers manipulated the 
NIRA’s vague language to circumvent Section 7(a).46 Due to the 
divide between Section 7(a)’s guarantees and Section 7(a)’s actual 
enforcement, industrial strife spread across the country and threatened 
economic recovery.47 
Consequently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an 
executive order establishing the National Labor Board (“NLB”).48 
Under the executive order, President Roosevelt gave the NLB the 
                                                 
41 Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling 
on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 302 (1987) (“[The drafters’] 
main concern was the fundamental and basic denial of the right to organize and 
bargain collectively.”). 
42 National Industrial Recovery Act § 7(a). 
43 Casebeer, supra note 41, at 300–02. 
44 See 79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1311, 1311 (1949) 
(statement of Sen. Wagner). 
45 Valerie A. Sanchez, A New Look at ADR in New Deal Labor Law 
Enforcement: The Emergence of a Dispute Processing Continuum Under the 
Wagner Act, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 621, 640 (2005). 
46 See 79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
47 Id. 
48 Exec. Order No. 6763 (1934) (creating the Original Board) available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14708; Exec. Order No. 7074 
(1935) (extending Original Board for another year) available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15079. 
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authority to resolve disputes arising under Section 7(a).49 The NLB 
had seven members: a chairman, three employer representatives, and 
three employee representatives.50 Although the NLB was more 
responsive than the NRA, the NLB had its own problems.51 First, the 
NLB often resolved cases by majority preference, rather than based on 
Section 7(a)’s substantive requirements.52 Second, the NLB could not 
control industry-specific boards, who were also interpreting Section 
7(a), which often created conflicting interpretations.53 Finally, the 
NLB had no enforcement power, except for the ability to refer cases to 
the Department of Justice.54 Moreover, the NLB could not compel 
evidence or witnesses, making prosecution nearly impossible.55 
Therefore, employers frequently ignored the NLB’s decisions without 
consequence.56 In sum, the NLB failed to protect employees who 
wanted to organize under Section 7(a).57 
 
B. The Wagner Act: Codifying the Board 
 
In response to the NLB’s problems, Senator Robert F. Wagner 
wanted legislation that would clearly define the substantive and 
procedural rights established in Section 7(a).58 Accordingly, Senator 
Wagner proposed legislation that defined the term “unfair labor 
practices”—something that Section 7(a) had failed to accomplish.59 
                                                 
49 Exec. Order No. 6763 available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=14708. 
50 Casebeer, supra note 41, at 302. 
51 See 79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
52 Casebeer, supra note 41, at 302. 
53 79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Casebeer, supra note 41, at 302. 
57 See id. 
58 S. REP. No. 79-1184, at 2–3 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1099, 1101 (1949). 
59 Id. at 2. 
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The legislation would also create a new Board with defined powers 
and procedures.60 Senator Wagner believed that more detailed 
legislation would resolve industrial strife by solidifying employee and 
employer expectations.61 
After two years of debate, Congress enacted the National Labor 
Relations Act (“Wagner Act”), which codified the NLB.62 The new 
Board (“Wagner Board”) would have three non-partisan members.63 
Congress envisioned the Wagner Board as a primarily adjudicative 
body, rather than a prosecutorial body.64 Consequently, the Wagner 
Board would not conciliate negotiations between industry and labor.65 
Instead, the Wagner Board would: (1) make final administrative 
interpretations in unfair labor practices cases; and (2) resolve disputes 
over union representation.66 Unlike the NLB, the Wagner Board would 
have binding authority over the parties, and its decisions would be 
subject to judicial review.67 
Despite the Wagner Act’s intentions, the Wagner Board struggled 
to gain legitimacy.68 Board opponents were concerned that unions 
exercised too much control over the Wagner Board.69 They also 
alleged that the Wagner Board—acting as prosecutor, judge and jury—
possessed too much power.70 They argued that the Wagner Board’s 
                                                 
60 Id. at 3. 
61 79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
62 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, §§ 3–16, 49 Stat. 449, 451–
57 (1935) reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 3270, 3272–79 (1949). 
63 Id. at § 3. 
64 S. REP. No. 79-1184, at 3 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1099, 1101–02 (1949). 
65 S. REP. No. 74-573, at 8 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 2300, 2307 (1949). 
66 S. REP. No. 79-1184, at 3. 
67 S. REP. No. 74-573, at 15. 
68 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 25 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 316 (1949).  
69 Id. at 6. 
70 Id. at 25. 
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nearly unchecked power to make factual determinations had caused 
the Board to act “arrogant, arbitrary, and unfair.”71 Additionally, the 
Wagner Board could not maintain its growing docket.72 By 1947, the 
Wagner Board was over a year behind schedule, which forced the 
Wagner Board to delegate decision-making authority to subordinate 
officers.73 Specifically, the Wagner Board had trial examiners create 
initial reports and advisory opinions.74 If no member disagreed with 
the trial examiner, the Wagner Board would adopt the trial examiner’s 
determination.75 In effect, the Wagner Board was ignoring its 
adjudicative functions, contrary to congressional intent.76 
 
C. The Taft-Hartley Act: Amending the Board 
 
Initially, the Senate and the House proposed different solutions to 
the Wagner Board’s problems.77 Under the Senate’s legislation, the 
Board would expand to seven members, but the Board could delegate 
its power to smaller panels.78 With seven members, the Board could 
hear and decide twice as many cases, and thus relieve its crowded 
docket.79 Additionally, the legislation emphasized the Board’s 
independent adjudicative purpose, and attempted to remove 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 414 (1949). 
73 Id. at 8–9. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Rather than adjudicating cases like an appellate court, like Congress 
intended, the Wagner Board was “disposing of cases in an institutional fashion.” Id. 
at 9. 
77 Compare S. 1126, 80th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 99, 
106–07 (1949), with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 1947) reprinted in 1 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, 
at 31, 44–45 (1949). 
78 S. 1126 at § 3. 
79 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947). 
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administrative influences from the Board’s decision-making process.80 
For instance, the Senate legislation prohibited the Board from relying 
on a trial examiner’s determination.81 Instead, the legislation 
envisioned a Board that would deliberate and decide cases more like 
an appellate court.82 
Rather than expanding the Board, the House proposed a pure 
separation between the Board’s adjudicative and administrative 
functions.83 The House believed that a purely adjudicative Board 
would operate more efficiently.84 Accordingly, the House advocated a 
purely adjudicative Board, with a new General Counsel to manage 
administrative matters.85 The House also prohibited the Board from 
using trial examiners during the decision-making process.86 Like the 
Senate, the House wanted the Board to operate more like an appellate 
court.87 
Despite initial disagreement, a House and Senate conference 
committee agreed to expand the Board’s membership to five 
members.88 Although unclear, the five-member board apparently eased 
concerns that a seven-member board would be “unwieldy.”89 To be 
sure, several Senators thought that efficient case resolution required 
                                                 
80 Id. at 9. 
81 S. 1126 at § 4. 
82 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 9. 
83 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 1947). 
84 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3534 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 601, 613 (1949) 
(statement of Rep. Hartley). 
85 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 6 (1947). 
86 Id. at 25. 
87 Id. at 6. 
88 H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 37 (1947) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 505, 
541 (1949) (printing initial joint resolution). 
89 S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 463, 495 (1949) 
(Senate minority report). 
 231
11
Murphy: The Seventh Circuit Giveth, and the District of Columbia Circuit
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
sufficient appropriations, rather than increased membership.90 This 
position coincides with the House legislation, which advocated case 
resolution through a more efficient allocation of resources and 
responsibilities.91 
The joint legislation also gave the Board the ability to delegate 
decision-making authority to three-member panels.92 Additionally, the 
legislation provided a quorum provision that created separate 
requirements for the Board and any delegated panel.93 Under the 
legislation, the Board needed three members to quorum, while a 
delegated panel only needed two members.94  
Moreover, the joint legislation created a new General Counsel to 
manage the Board’s administrative matters, including the Board’s 
prosecutorial and investigatory functions.95 The legislation also 
abolished the Board’s review division and prohibited the Board from 
consulting with trial examiners.96 Effectively, the joint legislation 
“limit[ed] the Board to the performance of quasi-judicial functions.”97 
On June 23, 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management 
Relations Act (“Taft-Hartley Act”).98 Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 
Congress expanded the Board consistent with the conference 
                                                 
90 93 CONG. REC. 4136, 4158 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1017, 1052 (1949) 
(statement of Sen. Murray); 93 CONG. REC. 6654, 6660 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 
1565, 1576 (1949) (statement of Sen. Murray). 
91 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3534 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 601, 613 (1949) 
(statement of Rep. Hartley). 
92 H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 5 (1947) (Conf. Rep.). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 5 (printing initial joint resolution). 
96 Id. at 37–38. 
97 Id. at 38. 
98 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 3–6, 61 Stat. 
136, 139–40 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1, 4–5 (1949). 
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committee’s recommendations; consequently, the Board would have 
five total members.99 As set forth above, Section 3(b) stated that: 
 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or 
more members any or all of the powers which it may itself 
exercise. A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of 
the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the 
Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members 
shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to 
the first sentence hereof.100 
 
Although the Taft-Hartley Act has since been amended, the 
relevant portions of Section 3(b) have remained unchanged.101 
 
D. The Board at Issue: A Two-Member Panel 
 
In December 2007, the Board had four active members, and thus 
one vacant seat.102 At that time, the Board’s members included: Wilma 
Liebman; Peter Schaumber; Peter Kirsanow; and Dennis Walsh.103 
However, Kirsanow and Walsh had terms expiring on December 31, 
2007.104 Without anyone appointed to fill the current or pending 
vacancies, the Board feared it would lose the ability to conduct 
business on January 1, 2008.105 Specifically, the Board knew it would 
lose its three-member quorum, which would effectively preclude the 
                                                 
99 Id. at § 3(a). 
100 Id. at § 3(b). 
101 Compare id. at § 3(a)–(b), with National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act 
§ 3(a)–(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)–(b) (2006). 
102 Board Members Since 1935, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/ 
board/board_members_since_1935.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
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Board from acting until the three-member quorum could be 
satisfied.106 
On December 20, 2007, the Board used Section 3(b) to delegate 
its decision-making authority to a three-member panel, which included 
Liebman, Schaumber and Kirsanow.107 The Board scheduled the 
delegation to take effect on December 28, 2007—three days before 
Kirsanow’s term expired.108 Essentially, the Board believed it could 
avoid the three-member quorum by delegating its power to a three-
member panel, which would be subject to a smaller, two-member 
quorum.109 If correct, the Board would retain its ability to decide cases 
when Kirsanow and Walsh retired.110 The Board justified its decision 
by relying on a plain reading of Section 3(b) and an opinion letter 
from the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”).111  
According to the Board and the OLC, Section 3(b) allowed the 
Board to issue decisions under the proposed arrangement, “as long as a 
quorum of two members remained.”112 They reasoned that, under 
Section 3(b), the Board could delegate power to a three-member panel, 
and that panel could decide cases with a two-member quorum.113 
Based on this interpretation, the two-member panel has gone on to 
issue hundreds of decisions.114 However, the panel’s decisions have 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 8. 
108 Id. at 8–9. 
109 See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) 
(2006) (“[T]hree members of the Board shall . . . constitute a quorum of the Board, 
except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant 
to the first sentence hereof.”).  
110 Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
111 Id. at 11. 
112 Id.; Quorum Requirements, Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 2003 WL 24166831, at 
*1 (Mar. 4, 2003). 
113 Id. 
114 See Brief of Petitioner at 13, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1162). 
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recently come under attack by petitioners challenging the Board’s 
interpretation of its authority to decide cases under Section 3(b).115 
 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Thus far, the First, Second, Seventh and D.C. Circuits have issued 
opinions interpreting Section 3(b).116 Despite the same relevant facts 
and statutory language, the Circuits have not only reached different 
conclusions, but they have also addressed different issues and applied 
different legal frameworks.117 This section will discuss the issues, 
legal reasoning and outcomes in the First Circuit’s decision in 
Northeastern Land Services, Ltd., v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
in Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB and the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Snell Island SNF, LLC v. NLRB.118 By 
analyzing these decisions, this section will establish a context for 
understanding the Seventh Circuit’s decision in New Process Steel, LP 
v. NLRB. 
 
A. The First Circuit: Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. v. NLRB 
 
Northeastern Land Services, Ltd., v. NLRB began when the Board 
determined that Northeastern Land Services (“NLS”) had violated the 
NLRA by committing an unfair labor practice.119 On appeal to the 
First Circuit, NLS challenged the Board’s authority to create what was 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 416–20 (2d Cir. 
2009) (discussing cases). 
116 See Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009); Snell 
Island, 568 F.3d 410; New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457); Laurel Baye 
Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
117 See generally Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d 36; Snell Island, 568 F.3d 410; 
New Process Steel, 564 F.3d 840; Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d 469. 
118 Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d 36; Snell Island, 568 F.3d 410; New Process 
Steel, 564 F.3d 840; Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d 469. 
119 560 F.3d at 39–40. 
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effectively a two-member panel.120 Consequently, the First Circuit had 
to determine whether the Board’s delegation complied with Section 
3(b).121 
The First Circuit held that the Board’s “delegation of its 
institutional power to a panel that ultimately consisted of a two-
member quorum . . . was lawful.”122 The First Circuit reached its 
conclusion based on a plain reading of Section 3(b).123 According to 
the First Circuit, Section 3(b) allowed the Board to delegate all its 
powers to a three-member panel, which the Board had done.124 
Further, the First Circuit held that, under Section 3(b)’s vacancy and 
quorum provisions,125 the two-member panel could decide cases 
despite permanently losing its third member.126 
Beyond its textual analysis, the First Circuit argued that its 
decision was consistent with an OLC opinion letter and the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB.127 The First Circuit 
cited both opinions as support for the proposition that a three-member 
panel can operate with only a two-member quorum.128 The OLC 
opinion letter argued that a panel could issue decisions, “as long as a 
quorum of two members remained.”129 The OLC reasoned that 
Section 3(b)’s plain meaning allowed the Board to delegate power t
three-member panels, which could then act with two members.
o 
                                                
130 In 
Photo-Sonics, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether a three-
member panel could act when one member resigned before the panel 
 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 40–41. 
122 Id. at 41. 
123 Id. at 41–42. 
124 Id. at 41. 
125 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
126 Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d at 41. 
127 Id. at 41–42. 
128 Id.  
129 Quorum Requirements, Op. Off. Legal Counsel,  2003 WL 24166831, at *1 
(Mar. 4, 2003). 
130 Id. 
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issued its official decision.131 The Ninth Circuit held that the pane
the authority to issue its decision because “all three panel membe
concurred in the decision.”
l had 
rs 
                                                
132 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit also argued 
that, under Section 3(b), the two-member panel satisfied the two-
member quorum requirement, and thus the panel could issue its 
decision regardless of the third member’s participation.133 
The First Circuit also suggested that, under Chevron USA, Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,134 the court should defer to 
the agency’s interpretation.135 However, the First Circuit neither 
applied Chevron nor explained how much deference it gave the 
Board’s interpretation.136 Furthermore, the First Circuit reasoned that 
finding the two-member panel unlawful would “impose an undue 
burden on the administrative process” by effectively halting Board 
operations.137 Like its insubstantial Chevron analysis, the First Circuit 
did not clearly explain whether administrative efficiency was essential 
to its decision.138 In fact, the First Circuit only briefly mentioned the 
concern, and provided little legal foundation to support the 
proposition.139 Consequently, the First Circuit did not discuss whether 
Chevron deference or pragmatic concerns were determinative, or even 
relevant, to its decision.140 
Nevertheless, after Northeastern Land Services, one thing was 
clear: the First Circuit interpreted Section 3(b) to allow three-member 
panels to continue operating with two-members.141 For the First 
 
131 Photo-Sonic, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1982). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 122–23. 
134 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
135 Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2009). 
136 See id. at 38–42. 
137 Id. at 41 (quoting R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1343 
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
138 Id. at 38–42. 
139 Id. at 41. 
140 See id. at 40–41. 
141 Id. 
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Circuit, neither the pending nor subsequent vacancies terminated the 
two-member panel’s ability to decide cases.142 In effect, the First 
Circuit held that, under Section 3(b), the Board lawfully delegated its 
decision-making authority to what was effectively a two-member 
panel.143 
 
B. The D.C. Circuit: Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake  
Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB 
 
Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB came to the 
D.C. Circuit after the Board found that Laurel Baye Healthcare 
(“LBH”) committed an unfair labor practice against a local union.144 
On appeal, LBH challenged the Board’s authority to act on two 
grounds.145 First, LBH made the same argument presented to the First 
Circuit: the Board cannot delegate its power to a three-member panel 
knowing the panel will operate with only two-members?146 
Alternatively, LBH argued that the two-member panel could not 
decide cases after the Board lost its three-member quorum.147 In other 
words, LBH claimed that the two-member panel could not act when 
the Board had only two members.148 
In Laurel Baye Healthcare, the D.C. Circuit found LBH’s second 
argument persuasive.149 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
two-member panel lost its decision-making power when the Board’s 
membership fell below three members, causing the Board to lose its 
quorum.150 The D.C. Circuit began its analysis with a textual analysis 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
145 Id. at 472. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. (“Because we find the second formulation of the argument convincing, 
we pretermit the first.”). 
150 Id. at 472. 
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of Section 3(b).151 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that allowing the Board 
to operate with two total members would render portions of Section 
3(b) inoperative.152 First, the D.C. Circuit argued that Section 3(b) 
requires the Board to satisfy its quorum requirement before it can 
lawfully act.153 If the Board could operate with only two members, the 
D.C. Circuit reasoned that Section 3(b)’s requirement that “the Board 
quorum . . . must be satisfied at all times” would be rendered 
inoperative.154 The D.C. Circuit also noted that Section 3(b)’s 
language would be an “unlikely” way to allow a two-member panel to 
act.155  
Second, the D.C. Circuit argued that Section 3(b)’s two quorum 
provisions operate concurrently.156 According to the D.C. Circuit, the 
panel’s two-member quorum requirement does not override the 
Board’s three-member quorum requirement.157 The D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that Section 3(b) uses two different “object nouns”—“the 
Board” and “any group”—which proves that “each quorum provision 
is independent from the other.” 158 Therefore, the panel’s quorum 
requirement merely establishes a different quorum for delegated 
panels.159 The D.C. Circuit concluded that “the [Board’s three-
member] quorum requirement . . . must still be satisfied, regardless of 
                                                 
151 Id. at 472–73. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (“[B]oard quorum requirement must be satisfied ‘at all times.’”(quoting 
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)) (emphasis in 
original)). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 473 (“[I]f Congress intended a two-member Board to be able to act as 
if it had a quorum, the existing statutory language would be an unlikely way to 
express that intention.”). 
156 Id. at 472–73. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 473. 
159 Id. at 472–73 (“[I]t does not seem odd at all that a sub-unit of any body 
would have a smaller quorum number than the quorum of the body as a whole” 
because quorums “are usually majorities.”). 
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whether the Board’s authority is delegated to a [smaller panel].”160 
Essentially, the D.C. Circuit saw the two-member panel as an 
unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the Board’s three-member 
quorum.161  
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit read Section 3(b)’s vacancy 
provision162 as being dependent on the Board’s three-member quorum 
requirement.163 The D.C. Circuit argued that the vacancy provision 
could be interpreted in two ways: (1) the Board cannot act with more 
than one vacancy164; or (2) the Board cannot function with more than 
two vacancies.165 The D.C. Circuit held that the latter interpretation 
was most consistent with Section 3(b)’s language.166 Specifically, the 
D.C. Circuit reasoned that this reading properly reconciled Section 
3(b)’s quorum requirement and vacancy provisions.167 Therefore, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that no decisions can be issued when the Board 
has more than two vacancies.168 
The D.C. Circuit also looked to agency and corporation law to 
support its plain reading.169 According to the court, a panel loses its 
authority when the delegating Board loses its quorum.170 When the 
Board lost its three-member quorum, the two-member panel also lost 
its decision-making authority.171 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a 
                                                 
160 Id. at 472. 
161 Id. at 473. 
162 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006) 
(“A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to 
exercise all of the powers of the Board . . . .”). 
163 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 475. 
164 See id. (reading vacancy literally to allow only one vacancy). 
165 Id. (“The Board’s ability to legally transact business exists only when three 
or more members are on the Board.”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 473. 
170 Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.07(4) (2006) and Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 504 (2008)). 
171 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 473. 
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delegated panel does not act on its own behalf; instead, the delegated 
panel acts on the Board’s behalf.172 If the Board cannot act, then the 
delegated panel also has no authority to act.173 Therefore, the two-
member panel could no longer decide cases after the Board lost its 
three-member quorum.174 
Furthermore, the D.C Circuit concluded that its prior precedents 
did not affect its holding.175 First, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the 
Board’s contention that Railroad Yardmasters of American v. Harris176 
permitted the Board to function without a three-member quorum.177 In 
Yardmasters, the D.C. Circuit allowed the National Mediation Board’s 
(“NMB”) two remaining members to delegate the NMB’s powers to 
one member on the same day the second member resigned.178 
Effectively, the D.C. Circuit allowed a single member to exercise the 
NMB’s powers even though the NMB could not satisfy its two-
member quorum.179 Despite the strikingly similar facts, the D.C. 
Circuit dismissed Yardmasters because the Yardmasters opinion 
explicitly limited the holding to its facts.180 The D.C. Circuit also 
reasoned that Yardmasters applied to advisory agencies, but not to 
agencies making substantive adjudications, like the Board.181 
The D.C. Circuit also distinguished Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. 
SEC.182 In 1995, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
promulgated a quorum regulation that allowed the SEC to operate with 
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 474. 
176 721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
177 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 474. 
178 721 F.2d at 1342–45. 
179 Id. at 1340. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 474–75. 
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a quorum of its remaining members.183 The petitioner in Falcon 
Trading challenged the SEC’s authority to promulgate quorum 
regulations under the Securities and Exchange Act.184 The D.C. 
Circuit upheld the SEC’s quorum regulation on the grounds that 
Congress had authorized the SEC to promulgate its own quorum 
rules.185 The D.C. Circuit argued that Falcon Trading did not apply to 
the Board because Section 3(b) explicitly establishes the Board’s 
quorum requirements.186 The D.C. Circuit found this distinction 
persuasive because Section 3(b)’s quorum requirements, unlike the 
SEC’s, precluded the Board from promulgating its own quorum 
regu
 that 
 
e, the 
D.C. Circuit held that, under Section 3(b), the Board, and any 
                                                
lations.187 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit did not find the First Circuit’s decision in 
Northeastern Land Services persuasive.188 The D.C. Circuit noted
the First Circuit’s decision only determined whether a panel can 
operate with two members.189 However, in Laurel Baye Healthcare, 
the D.C. Circuit addressed the question whether a panel can operate 
when the Board loses its three-member quorum.190 Because the First 
Circuit addressed a different question, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
Northeastern Land Services offered little guidance.191 Therefor
 
183 17 C.F.R. § 200.41 (2009) (“A quorum of the Commission shall consist of 
three members; provided, however, that if the number of Commissioners in office is 
less than three, a quorum shall consist of the number of members in office.”). 
184 Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
185 Id. (citing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78w(a)(1) (2006) as authority for the proposition that Congress had delegated the 
relevant rulemaking authority to the SEC). 
186 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 475. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 475–76. 
189 Id. (“The determination of [the continuing validity of a three-member 
delegee group after the expiration of the term of one member] is not necessary to our 
decision.”). 
190 Id. at 476 (finding “the lack of a quorum on the Board as a whole is the 
determining factor”). 
191 Id. 
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delegated panel, cannot decide cases when the Board has less than 
three members.192   
Although the D.C. Circuit found LBH’s second argument 
dispositive, the court indirectly discussed whether the Board could 
create what was effectively a two-member panel.193 The D.C. Circuit 
suggested that the court would have interpreted Section 3(b) to allow 
the two-member panel to act after the third member vacated her 
seat.194 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit stated that “a three-member 
Board may delegate its powers to a three-member group, and this 
[panel] may act with two members” if the Board’s three-member 
quorum requirement is satisfied.195 The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning is 
consistent with the First Circuit decision finding two-member panels 
lawful under Section 3(b).196 However, the D.C. Circuit did not 
discuss whether the Board’s intent for the three-member panel to 
operate as a two-member panel would be a relevant distinction.197 
Regardless of this distinction, the D.C. Circuit would only allow the 
panel to act if the Board could satisfy its three-member quorum.198 
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit has not definitively decided whether the 
Board can delegate its power to what is effectively a two-member 
panel.199 
 
C. The Second Circuit: Snell Island SNF, LLC v. NLRB 
 
Snell Island SNF, LLC v. NLRB came to the Second Circuit after 
the two-member panel determined that an employer illegally refused 
                                                 
192 Id. at 472–73. 
193 Id. at 472. 
194 See id. at 472–73. 
195 Id.  
196 Id. 
197 See id. at 472–76. 
198 Id. at 472–73 (holding two-member panel may act “so long as the Board 
quorum requirement is, ‘at all times,’ satisfied) (quoting National Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. 153(b) (2006)). 
199 Id. at 472. 
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to negotiate with a local union.200 On appeal, the employers 
challenged the Board’s authority to act on the same two groun
the petitioners relied on in Laurel Baye Healthcare.
ds that 
 what 
ree-
                                                
201 First, the 
employers argued that the Board could not delegate its power to
was effectively a two-member panel.202 Second, the employers argued 
that the two-member panel could not act when the Board lost its th
member quorum.203 
Unlike the D.C. Circuit,204 the Second Circuit addressed both of 
the employer’s arguments.205 The Second Circuit began its analysis by 
holding that the Board could delegate its power to what was 
effectively a two-member panel.206 Agreeing with the Northeastern 
Land Services decision,207 the Second Circuit interpreted Section 3(b) 
to allow the Board to establish a three-member panel.208 Further, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that a pending vacancy had “no bearing on 
the fact that the panel was lawfully constituted in the first instance.”209 
In effect, a two-member panel can issue decisions, so long as the 
Board initially delegates its powers to three active members.210 
 
200 568 F.3d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 2009). 
201 Compare Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 411 (deciding “whether . . . a two-
member panel . . . is permitted under Section 3(b) . . . where a third member of the 
panel was disqualified because his term had expired and the total membership of the 
NLRB was only two members”), with Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472 
(deciding whether Board can delegate power to what is effectively a two-member 
panel and whether the NLRB can act with only two members). 
202 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419. 
203 Id. 
204 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472 (“Because we find the second 
[argument] convincing, we pretermit the first [argument].”). 
205 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419–24. 
206 Id. at 419. 
207 See Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(interpreting Section 3(b)’s plain meaning to allow the Board to delegate its power to 
a three-member panel despite a third member’s pending vacancy). 
208 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. (holding a panel must be “duly constituted in the first 
instance . . . before the action of a quorum of the panel is valid”) (internal quotation 
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Next, the Second Circuit addressed the employer’s argument that 
the panel could not decide cases when the Board could not satisfy its 
three-member quorum.211 The Second Circuit, however, offered a 
different framework for analyzing the issue.212 The Second Circuit 
applied Chevron analysis213 to determine whether the panel could act 
when the Board had only two members.214 Initially, the Second Circuit 
found that Chevron applied even though the statutory interpretation 
involved a question about the agency’s authority.215 After deciding that 
Chevron applied, the Second Circuit began its analysis by determining 
whether Section 3(b) allowed the two-member panel to continue 
deciding cases.216 However, the Second Circuit found that Section 
3(b)’s plain language did not explicitly answer the question.217 
Following Second Circuit precedent, the court turned to canons of 
statutory construction to help resolve this question.218 The Second 
Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the Board cannot act without 
a three-member quorum; otherwise, the quorum provision’s “at all 
                                                                                                                   
marks and citations omitted); see also Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 
(2003). 
211 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419–20. 
212 Compare id. at 419–24 (analyzing the Board’s authority to act with two 
members under Chevron), with Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, LLC v. 
NLRB, 564 F.3d 470, 472–76 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (analyzing the Board’s authority to 
act with a primarily plain meaning reading), and New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 
564 F.3d 840, 846–48 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 
2009) (No. 08-1457) (same). 
213 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–45 (1984) (when Congress has not explicitly expressed its intent in a statute, the 
court will defer to the administrating agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation). 
214 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419–24.  
215 Id. at 415–16 (collecting cases). 
216 Id. at 419–20. 
217 Id. at 420 (“[N]othing in the statute itself explains what happens to a duly 
constituted panel of the NLRB when the Board itself loses its quorum.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
218 Id. (quoting N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. Admin., 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
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times” language would be rendered inoperative.219 However, the 
Second Circuit found that this argument did not explicitly indicate 
“what happens to a panel that was duly constituted before the Board 
lost its quorum.”220  
The Second Circuit explained that, unlike the D.C. Circuit, its 
precedent did not allow it to look to traditional doctrines of agency for 
guidance.221 Instead, the Second Circuit focused on Section 3(b)’s 
legislative history.222 The Second Circuit noted that the Taft-Hartley 
Act’s primary purpose was to equalize the power between employers 
and employees.223 Despite the Taft-Hartley Act’s sweeping reform, the 
Second Circuit found little legislative history on Section 3(b).224 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that Senators, both supporting 
and opposing the Taft-Hartley Act, acknowledged that increasing the 
Board would increase its efficiency.225 By expanding the Board’s 
membership, the Board could double its productivity and relieve its 
overcrowded docket.226 Although the Senate appeared concerned with 
                                                 
219 Id. (holding Board quorum requirement must be satisfied at all times); 
accord Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472–73  
220 Id. at 420.  
221 Id. (“Our Court’s precedents . . . require us to turn to legislative history 
instead of considering related fields of law . . . .”). 
222 Id. at 420–23. 
223 Id. at 420 (citing Lawrence M. Friedman, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 189 (2002)).  
224 Id. at 420–23. 
225 Id. at 421; 93 CONG. REC. 3950, 3953 (1947) reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 
1005, 1011 (1949) (Taft-Hartley Act sponsor Senator Robert A. Taft explaining that 
increasing the Board’s membership would allow the Board to hold twice as many 
hearings); 93 CONG. REC. 6593, 6614 (1947) reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1526, 1562 (1949) 
(Taft-Hartley Act opponent Senator Wayne L. Morse explaining that a larger Board 
could hear more cases). 
226 See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 19 (1947) (Senate Bill expanded the Board from 
three members to seven members subject to the delegation and quorum provisions 
currently provided for in Section 3(b)); id. at 8 (“[E]xpansion of the Board . . . would 
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the Board’s efficiency, the Second Circuit claimed that the House did 
not substantively discuss expanding the Board;227 rather, the House 
only noted that the final bill retained the Board, but increased its 
membership from three to five members.228 In all of Section 3(b)’s 
legislative history, the Second Circuit only found one statement 
addressing the precise issue presented.229 The Second Circuit found 
that Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney raised the question whether 
Section 3(b) allowed the Board to operate with “less than a quorum of 
the Board.”230 Because Senator O’Mahoney’s statement elicited no 
response, the Second Circuit dismissed his statement as a stray 
comment.231 
Additionally, the Second Circuit observed that originally the 
NLRA had established a three-member Board that could act with a 
two-member quorum.232 The Second Circuit also found that, prior to 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board had operated with a two-member 
quorum on three separate occasions.233 Nonetheless, the Second 
Circuit concluded that, although the Taft-Hartley Act intended to 
enable the Board to resolve more disputes, the legislative history did 
                                                                                                                   
permit [the Board] to operate in panels of three, thereby increasing . . . its ability to 
dispose of cases” by one-hundred percent, thus relieving its crowded docket). 
227 See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 25 (1947). 
228 H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 37 (1947) (“The conference agreement . . . retains 
the existing Board but increases its membership to five”). 
229 Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 422 (2d Cir. 2009). 
230 93 CONG. REC. 7677, 7679 (1947) reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1629, 1632 (1949) 
(Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney stating that “we have a bill . . . which not only 
authorizes the Board to delegate its powers, but authorizes the Board to delegate its 
powers . . . to less than a quorum of the Board”). 
231 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 422. 
232 Id. at 421–22. 
233 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 421 (Board operated with a two-member quorum 
three times before the Taft-Hartley Act passed: (1) two-member quorum issued three 
decisions between August 31, 1936 and September 23, 1936; (2) two-member 
quorum issued 239 decisions between August 27, 1940 and November 26, 1940; and 
(3) two-member quorum issued 224 decisions between August 27, 1941 and October 
11, 1941). 
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not conclusively determine whether a delegated panel could continue 
to act when the Board lost its quorum.234 
Because the Second Circuit could not conclude that Congress had 
addressed the precise question presented, the court proceeded to 
Chevron step-two.235 At step-two, the Second Circuit held that the 
Board’s interpretation—Section 3(b) allowed two-member panels to 
act when the Board lost its quorum—was reasonable.236 The Second 
Circuit reasoned that the Taft-Hartley Act intended to increase the 
Board’s efficiency and the Board’s interpretation fulfilled this 
purpose.237 Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that “[c]ourts have 
generally been sympathetic to a federal agency’s efforts to continue to 
operate in the face of vacancies.”238  
Although the Second Circuit found the Board’s interpretation 
reasonable, the court did not accept the Board’s interpretation as the 
only reasonable conclusion.239 In fact, the Second Circuit noted that 
the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 3(b) was also 
reasonable.240 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit still deferred t
Board’s interpretation, as required by Chevron.
o the 
e 
 
s 
                                                
241 Consequently, th
court upheld the two-member panel’s authority to decided cases.242
The Second Circuit’s outcome, however, is the result of Chevron’
deferential framework, rather than the court reaching a definitive 
conclusion.243 
 
234 Id. at 423 (holding “we are unable to conclude that delegation to less than a 
quorum of the Board was an intended or unintended consequence of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments”). 
235 Id. at 423–24. 
236 Id. at 424. 
237 Id. at 423–24. 
238 Id. at 423 n.8. 
239 Id. at 424. 
240 Id. (noting that “the D.C. Circuit’s view that where a Board loses its 
authority, so does its panels . . . is also a reasonable interpretation of [Section 3(b)]”) 
241 Id. at 423–24. 
242 Id. at 424. 
243 See id. at 419–24 (Second Circuit fails to offer its own interpretation of 
Section 3(b)). 
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III. NEW PROCESS STEEL, LP V. NLRB 
 
After receiving an adverse ruling from the two-member panel, 
New Process appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit.244 In the 
relevant portion of the appeal, New Process challenged the Board’s 
ability to delegate its power to what was effectively a two-member 
panel.245 Because of New Process’ limited argument, the Seventh 
Circuit did not have to determine whether a panel could continue to act 
after the Board lost its quorum.246 
According to the Seventh Circuit, the Board could delegate its 
power to what was effectively a two-member panel.247 Consequently, 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the two-member panel’s ability to continue 
issuing decisions.248 The Seventh Circuit interpreted Section 3(b) to 
allow this result by its plain language.249 Specifically, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that Section 3(b)’s delegation provision250 allowed 
                                                 
244 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB 564 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
245 Id. (“New Process alleges that [the] delegation procedure 
violates . . . [Section] 3(b) . . . because it was in fact a delegation to a two-member 
panel rather than a three-member panel.”). 
246 Compare id. at 845–48 (analyzing only whether the Board could delegate 
power to what is effectively a two-member panel), with Laurel Baye Healthcare of 
Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472–76 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (analyzing only 
whether the panel could continue acting when the Board had two total members), 
and Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419–24 (analyzing both whether the Board could 
delegate power to what is effectively a two-member panel and whether the panel 
could continue acing when the Board had two total members). 
247 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845–48. 
248 Id. at 845–46. 
249 Id. at 845 (“[T]he vacancy of one member of a three member panel does not 
impede the right of the remaining two members” from acting “indeed is the plain 
meaning of [Section 3(b)].”). 
250 “The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.” National Labor 
Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
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the Board to delegate its authority to a three-member panel.251 Further, 
the Seventh Circuit argued that Section 3(b)’s quorum provision252 
expressly states that a three-member panel only needs a two-member 
quorum to issue decisions.253 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that New 
Process’ interpretation would render Section 3(b)’s quorum provision 
inoperative because a three-member panel would be prohibited from 
operating with two members.254 The Seventh Circuit noted that its 
interpretation was consistent with the First Circuit’s opinion in 
Northeastern Land Services and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Photo-
Sonics.255 
The Seventh Circuit then analyzed the Taft-Hartley Act’s 
legislative history to determine whether its interpretation was 
consistent with Congress’ intent.256 The Seventh Circuit discovered 
that the House and Senate had proposed different solutions for 
amending the Board.257 According to the Seventh Circuit, the House 
                                                 
251 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845–46. 
252 “[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of 
the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any [three-member 
panel].” National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b). 
253 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 846. 
254 Id. at 846 n.2 (“New Process’ reading . . . appears to sap the quorum 
provision of any meaning, because it would prohibit a properly constituted panel of 
three members from proceeding with a quorum of two.”). 
255 Id. (interpreting Section 3(b) as allowing the Board to delegate power to 
what is effectively a two-member panel); accord Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 
560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 122–23 
(9th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Section 3(b) to allow legally delegated three-member 
panels to continue acting with a two-member quorum). However, at the time the 
Seventh Circuit decided New Process Steel, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Second 
Circuit had issued their opinions. Compare New Process Steel, 564 F.3d 840 
(decided May 1, 2009), with Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 
564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (decided May 1, 2009), and Snell Island SNF LLC v. 
NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009) (decided June 17, 2009). 
256 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 846–47. 
257 Id. at 847 (comparing H.R.REP. No. 80-245, at 25 (1947) with S. REP. No. 
80-105, at 19 (1947)). 
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intended to create a new board that would only decide cases.258 The 
Senate, on the other hand, wanted to expand the Board to seven 
members, subject to provisions similar to those found in Section 
3(b).259 The Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress’ primarily 
concerned was improving the Board’s efficiency.260 The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that invalidating the panel, and effectively preventing 
the panel from operating, would be an inefficient result.261 Therefore, 
the Seventh Circuit held that, without additional legislative history,262 
allowing the panel to decide cases would be more consistent with 
congressional intent.263 
The Seventh Circuit also reviewed several prior decisions to 
determine whether its interpretation was sound.264 The Seventh Circuit 
began by discussing Nguyen v. United States, in which the Supreme 
Court held that a court of appeals panel could not operate with two 
Article III judges and one Article IV judge.265 According to the 
Supreme Court, under the relevant statute,266 a court of appeals panel 
could not lawfully operate without three Article III judges.267 The 
Supreme Court also held that a two-judge common law quorum 
requirement did not affect the initial delegation’s lawfulness.268 The 
                                                 
258 Id. (analyzing H.R.REP. No. 80-245, at 25).  
259 Id. (analyzing S. REP. No. 80-105, at 19). 
260 Id. (holding that although the House was also concerned with the quality of 
the Board’s decisions, Congress’ “primary concern was increasing the efficiency of 
the Board”). 
261 Id. at 847. 
262 Id. (arguing that, to support its interpretation, New Process needed 
legislative history “establishing that the Board was forbidden from operating with a 
quorum of two, or that Congress was particularly concerned about delegating 
authority to Board members whose term was about to expire”). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 847–48. 
265 Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82–83 (2003). 
266 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000). 
267 Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 83. 
268 Id. 
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Seventh Circuit distinguished Nguyen on two grounds.269 First, the 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that the court of appeals statute contained 
neither a delegation nor a quorum provision.270 Second, the court 
noted that Congress created the court of appeals statute to stop circuits 
from assigning cases to two-judge panels.271 Because of these 
distinctions, the Seventh Circuit found little guidance in Nguyen.272 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit discussed its decision in Assure 
Competitive Transportation, Inc. v. United States to support its Section 
3(b) interpretation.273 In Assure, the court had to determine what 
constituted a quorum of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”).274 The ICC consisted of eleven members and the statute 
defined a quorum as “a majority of the ICC.”275 However, the statute 
also contained a vacancy provision that prevented vacancies from 
stopping ICC operations.276 According to the court, the ICC statute 
only required the ICC to have a majority of existing members to 
satisfy its quorum.277 Therefore, the ICC could act when a majority of 
the existing six members participated.278 New Process objected that 
the Assure court upheld the quorum because the ICC asked Congress 
to resolve the statute’s ambiguity before it acted.279 But according to 
the Seventh Circuit, this distinction was irrelevant.280 The court 
reasoned that, unlike the ICC statute, Section 3(b) explicitly allowed 
                                                 
269 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. (Section 3(b) “contains quorum and delegation clauses that cover the 
scenario at issue here”). 
273 Id. at 845. 
274 Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 472–73 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
275 Id. at 472. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 473. 
278 Id. 
279 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
280 Id. 
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the Board to delegate its power to what would effectively be a two-
member panel.281 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit cited three additional cases for the 
proposition that a “public board has the authority to act despite 
vacancies.”282 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that only the Board has 
the authority to act, not individual Board members.283 However, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that the Board could not act without a 
three-member quorum.284 Because the Seventh Circuit did not address 
the question of whether the Board can act with only two members,  it 
is unclear whether this proposition would have persuaded the Seventh 
Circuit. 285 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit’s 
language is nearly identical to language used by the D.C. Circuit in its 
agency law analysis.286 With that said, the Seventh Circuit found the 
Board’s initial delegation lawful under Section 3(b), and therefore 
upheld the two-member panel’s authority to issue decisions.287 
                                                 
281 Id. (holding that “[g]iven that the plain meaning of the statute supports 
NLRB’s [sic] reading of the statute, New Process’ interpretation of Assure is 
unpersuasive”). 
282 Id. (citing FTC v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 389 U.S. 179 (1967); Falcon Trading 
Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996); R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. 
Harris, 721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. (reasoning that the “NLRB has the authority to act so long as they have 
satisfied the quorum requirements”). 
285 See id. at 845 (deciding whether the NLRB violated Section 3(b) “because 
[the delegation] was in fact a delegation to a two-member panel rather than a three-
member panel”). 
286 Compare id. at 848 (“[A] public board has the authority to act despite 
vacancies because the board, rather than the individual members, has the authority to 
act.”), with Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 473 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“It must be remembered that the delegee committee does not act on 
its own behalf . . . . [t]he only authority by which the committee can act is that of the 
Board.”). 
287 See New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848. 
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IV. CHEVRON: A WORKABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
At the outset, it is critical to remember that there are two separate 
arguments challenging the two-member panel’s authority.288 First, 
there is a question whether the Board can delegate its powers to what 
is effectively a two-member panel.289 In other words, can the Board 
create a three-member panel when it knows the panel will really 
operate with two members?290 This argument challenges the 
lawfulness of the Board’s initial delegation. In effect, petitioners have 
argued that the Board’s intent determines whether the delegation is 
lawful.291 According to the Board’s challengers, if the Board really 
wants a two-member panel, then the delegation violates Section 
3(b).292 On the contrary, the Board argues that its intent is irrelevant, 
and thus Section 3(b) only requires an initial delegation to three active 
members.293 That is to say, if the Board delegates authority to a three 
members, then the delegation is always lawful.294 
Unlike the first issue, the second question involves events 
occurring after the Board’s initial delegation.295 The second question 
asks whether the two-member panel may continue deciding cases 
when the Board loses its three-member quorum.296 This argument 
involves the relationship between the Board and the delegated 
panel.297 Specifically, petitioners argue that when the entire Board 
                                                 
288 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. 
289 See id. 
290 Id. 
291 See id. 
292 Id. 
293 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
294 See id. 
295 See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 422 (2d Cir. 2009). 
296 Id. 
297 See Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472–73. 
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cannot quorum, any delegated panel also loses its authority.298 Under 
this theory, a panel cannot act when the Board’s membership falls 
below three members.299 To properly analyze Section 3(b), one must 
first recognize the distinction between these arguments. 
Furthermore, these two issues provide alternative arguments for 
challenging the Board’s authority.300 If the Supreme Court finds that 
either interpretation precludes the two-member panel from acting, then 
the panel’s actions must be deemed unlawful.301 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court would have to invalidate the Board’s decision and 
preclude the Board from issuing decisions.302 Removing the Board’s 
authority, however, would have a significant impact on labor relations. 
In effect, the Board would be prevented from resolving labor disputes 
until “such times as [the Board] may once again consist of sufficient 
members to constitute a quorum.”303 Nevertheless, the Circuits have 
mostly succeeded in allowing the Board to avoid this fate.304 Through 
various legal frameworks and analyses, every Circuit addressing the 
Board’s current structure, except the D.C. Circuit, has found that the 
two-member panel complies with Section 3(b).305 
Despite these decisions, this section will show that a close reading 
of Section 3(b) and its legislative history does not precisely resolve 
either question. 306  Consequently, the Circuits have been forced into 
                                                 
298 Id. at 472. 
299 See id. 
300 Id. (holding that “because we find the second formulation . . . convincing, 
we pretermit the first”). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 476. 
303 Id. 
304 E.g., New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
305 Compare New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848, Snell Island SNF LLC v. 
NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 422 (2d Cir. 2009), and Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 
F.3d 36, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009), with Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472–73. 
306 Although the Board has continued to function, the two-member panel has 
refused to decide difficult cases. See Sam Hananel, Gridlocked NLRB Puts Off 
Notable Labor-Law Cases, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 26, 2009, 
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attenuated reasoning to justify allowing the Board to continue 
operating. Furthermore, each Circuit has provided its own unique 
analysis statute.307 With hundreds of Board decision hanging in the 
balance, a more convincing justification is needed. Fortunately, 
Chevron analysis provides a legal framework that both embraces 
Section 3(b)’s ambiguity and allows the Board to continue resolving 
disputes.308 
 
A. Chevron Analysis: Deferring to an Agency’s Interpretation of  
Its Own Authority? 
 
Before applying Chevron analysis, the Supreme Court must first 
determine whether Chevron deference should apply to the Board’s 
interpretation of its own authority.309 While many Circuits apply 
Chevron in such cases, some Circuits, like the Seventh Circuit, have 
reached the opposite conclusion.310 Traditionally, Circuits have offered 
two rationales for refusing to extend Chevron to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own authority.311 First, these Circuits claim that 
agencies have “no special expertise” in interpreting their own 
authority.312 Second, these Circuits argue that agencies should not 
make policy determinations that limit or expand their own authority.313 
                                                                                                                   
http://www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/lifestyles/health_med_fit/article/I-
NLRB0903_20090924-231810/295413/. 
307 See generally Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d 36; Snell Island SNF LLC v. 
NLRB, 568 F.3d 410; New Process Steel, 564 F.3d 840; Laurel Baye Healthcare, 
564 F.3d 469. 
308 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–45 (1984). 
309 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986). 
310 See N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“While . . . several other [C]ircuits have granted deference to an agency’s 
determination of its own jurisdiction . . . . [w]e believe that de novo review is 
appropriate.”). 
311 See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
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Nevertheless, as Justice Antonin Scalia has observed, the Supreme 
Court has rejected both arguments.314 In Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) promulgated a rule that allowed it to hear certain 
counterclaims.315 Under the CFTC’s enabling act, the CFTC could 
promulgate rules “reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the 
provisions or to accomplish any of the [CFTC’s] purposes.”316 The 
CFTC argued that this provision granted the CFTC the authority to 
hear counterclaims.317 Despite the “statutory interpretation-
jurisdictional nature of the question,” the Supreme Court deferred to 
the CFTC’s interpretation.318 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the argument that an agency does not have superior 
expertise in interpreting its own auth 319ority.  
                                                
In City of New York v. Federal Communication Commission, the 
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that agencies cannot 
interpret the scope of their own authority.320 The Court reasoned that 
federal agencies are often given a “broad grant of authority to 
reconcile conflicting policies.”321 So long as the policy determination 
is delegated to the agency, courts should not disturb an agency’s 
reasonable determination.322 
Justice Scalia also noted that Chevron deference is both necessary 
and appropriate when agencies interpret their own authority.323 First, 
 
314 Id. 
315 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986). 
316 Id. at 845. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 843–44 (“The Court of Appeals declined to defer to the CFTC's 
interpretation because, in its view . . . the question was not one on which a 
specialized administrative agency, in contrast to a court of general jurisdiction, had 
superior expertise. . . . We find [this reason] insubstantial.”). 
320 City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988). 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381–82 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Chevron is necessary because there is no relevant distinction between 
an agency taking unauthorized action and an agency exceeding its 
delegated authority.324 If this distinction controlled, courts would 
apply Chevron deference “depending upon how generally [they] 
describe[d] the authority.”325 Second, Chevron deference, by its own
rationale, “would naturally expect that the agency would be 
responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its 
statutory authority.”
 
esolve 
 want 
, 
, 
what they can bear.  
                                                
326 Otherwise, federal courts would have to r
every statutory ambiguity de novo; however, Congress would not
de novo review of “every ambiguity in statutory authority.”327 If 
Congress disagrees with the agency’s interpretation, Congress can 
amend the statutory language to resolve the ambiguity.328 Thus
Chevron deference places the ultimate policy determination with the 
legislative and executive branches, rather than the judiciary.329 Finally
Chevron limits the agency’s interpretation to the relevant statute, 
which allows the Circuits to avoid expanding traditional legal 
doctrines beyond 330
As applied to the Board, Congress has granted the Board the 
authority to make “such rules and regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out” the Board’s responsibilities.331 Congress also “declared [it] 
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain 
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.”332 
Furthermore, Section 3(b) gives the Board considerable authority in 
arranging its own decision-making apparatus.333 When read together, 
 
324 Id. at 381. 
325 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
326 Id. at 381–82. 
327 Id. at 382. 
328 Id. 
329 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–45 (1984). 
330 See id. 
331 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). 
332 Id. § 1. 
333 Id. § 3(b). 
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the provisions have given the Board the ability to interpret its own 
authority under Section 3(b). In sum, the Supreme Court has solid 
legal support for applying Chevron deference to the Board’s 
interpretation of its own authority. 
 
B. Chevron Application 
 
After determining that Chevron controls, the Supreme Court 
applies Chevron’s two-step test to the Board’s interpretation.334 At 
Chevron step-one, the Supreme Court must determine whether 
Congress has explicitly answered the precise question presented.335 
Primarily, the Supreme Court looks to the applicable statute when 
determining whether Congress has provided the answer.336 However, 
the Supreme Court will also look to the statute’s legislative history, 
particularly when the statute’s language is unclear.337 If Congress has 
explicitly answered the question, the Supreme Court will enforce 
Congress’ intent.338 In other words, the Supreme Court will not defer 
to an agency’s interpretation when the statute clearly provides the 
answer.339 In the Board’s case, the Supreme Court does not have to 
decide how Section 3(b) resolves the issues presented; instead, the 
Supreme Court has to decide whether Section 3(b) is ambiguous on 
those issues.340  
If they find Section 3(b) ambiguous, the Supreme Court proceeds 
to Chevron step-two.341 At Chevron step-two, the Court defers to a 
reasonable agency interpretation.342 In fact, Chevron deference applies 
                                                 
334 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. 
335 Id. at 842–43. 
336 See id. at 843 n.9. 
337 Id. at 845. 
338 Id. at 842–43. 
339 Id. (holding that “the agency[] must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress”). 
340 See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419–23 (2d Cir. 2009). 
341 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
342 Id. 
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even though the statute can be interpreted in multiple ways.343 
Chevron deference only requires a reasonable interpretation and not 
the best interpretation.344 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should 
defer to the Board’s Section 3(b) interpretation, as long as they find
the interpretation reasonable.345
 
 
                                                
 
1.  Delegating Power to What Is Effectively a Two-Member Panel 
 
First, the Supreme Court should use Chevron analysis to 
determine whether the Board can delegate its power to what is 
effectively a two-member panel. At Chevron step-one, the Supreme 
Court must determine whether Section 3(b) explicitly answers the 
question.346 Thus far, the Circuits have unanimously interpreted 
Section 3(b) to allow the Board to create what is effectively a two-
member panel.347 At first glance, their reasoning appears persuasive; 
however, a closer reading reveals that the Section 3(b) does not 
precisely indicate whether the delegation is lawful.  
The Circuits have answered the question with a purely technical 
reading of Section 3(b).348 According to the Circuits, the dispositive 
inquiry is: was power initially delegated to three members?349 If the 
answer is yes, then the Circuits have found the delegation lawful.350 
While this reading is tenable, the question remains whether Section 
3(b) explicitly allows this result. Clearly, Section 3(b) would not allow 
the Board to delegate its power to a two-member panel.351 
 
343 Id. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not conclude that the agency construction 
was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction.”).  
344 See id. 
345 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 422–23. 
346 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45. 
347 See generally New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457); Ne. Land 
Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009);  Snell Island, 568 F.3d 410. 
348 See, e.g., New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845–46. 
349 See id. at 845. 
350 See id. 
351 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
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Nevertheless, under the Circuits’ reading, the Board can delegate its 
power to a two-member panel by including a sham member—a 
member whose term is about to expire—in its initial delegation.352 But 
should a purely technical delegation allow the Board to create a two-
member panel? In both cases, after all, the Board intends to create a 
two-member panel. 
In fact, the Circuits’ interpretations have completely ignored the 
Board’s intent.353 By ignoring the Board’s intent, the Circuits create an 
irrational result: the Board can delegate its power to a two-member 
panel, so long as it includes a sham third member.354 Effectively, the 
Circuits interpret the delegation provision as allowing two-member 
panels.355 Thus, the Board is now free to circumvent the three-member 
panel requirement by including a sham member in the initial 
delegation. Such a result is inconsistent with Section 3(b)’s 
language.356 
The vacancy and quorum provisions also fail to answer the 
question. The vacancy provision states that “a vacancy in the Board 
shall not impair . . . the powers of the Board.”357 The Circuits read this 
provision as explicitly allowing a two-member panel to operate despite 
a subsequent vacancy.358 However, the vacancy provision does not 
explicitly address a vacancy in a three-member panel, only the Board 
as a whole.359 Thus, the vacancy provision offers little guidance on the 
precise question presented.  
                                                 
352 See New Process Steel, 564 F.3d 845–46. 
353 E.g., id. at 845–48. 
354 Id. at 846 (holding that “[a]s long as the panel consisted of three NLRB 
members at the time it was constituted,” the panel can operate with two members).  
355 Id. 
356 See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b). 
357 Id. (emphasis added). 
358 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d 845–46. 
359 See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b) (stating that “[A] 
vacancy in the Board shall not impair . . . the powers of the Board” (emphasis 
added)). 
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The quorum provision provides a better explanation about the 
effect of vacancies on a three-member panel.360 Because the quorum 
provision allows a three-member panel to operate with a two-member 
quorum, it seems clear that a panel can operate with two members, so 
long as the original delegation is lawful.361 Nevertheless, the quorum 
provision does not answer the precise question.362 The challenge is to 
the Board’s initial delegation, which must be lawful before the panel 
can act.363 Even if the quorum provision allows a three-member panel 
to act with two members, the question remains whether the Board can 
delegate its powers to the panel in the first place.  
In fact, both the vacancy and quorum provisions regulate events 
occurring after the delegation, rather than the actual delegation.364 If 
the delegation initially violates Section 3(b), neither the quorum 
provision nor the vacancy provision can save the delegation.365 That 
is, even if an initial two-member delegation satisfies the vacancy an
quorum provisions, the initial two-member delegation nevertheless 
clearly violates Section 3(b). Consequently, neither provision helps 
resolve the question whether the Board’s delegation was lawful. 
d 
                                                
The legislative history also fails to provide a precise answer. The 
Circuits that have parsed the legislative history have been persuaded 
by the Senate’s concern about the Board’s efficiency.366 Specifically, 
those Circuits have noted that the Senate wanted to expand the Board 
to seven members and to allow three-member panels; this way, the 
Board could resolve more cases.367 While this explains why Section 
3(b) allows the Board to delegate its powers to three-member panels, 
 
360 The panel’s quorum provision states that “two members shall constitute a 
quorum” when the Board delegates its authority to a three-member panel. Id. 
361 Id. 
362 See id. 
363 Id. 
364 See id. 
365 See id. 
366 See New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
367 Id. (noting that Congress’ “primary concern was increasing the efficiency of 
the Board” by creating a larger Board). 
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efficiency alone cannot justify delegating power to a two-member 
panel. Again, Section 3(b) explicitly disallows two-member panels.368 
If Congress had wanted to allow two-member panels, they would have 
drafted Section 3(b) accordingly.    
Moreover, a closer reading of Section 3(b)’s legislative history 
shows that Congress also wanted a more judicious Board.369 
Specifically, some Senators wanted a Board that would act like an 
appellate court “where divergent views . . . [would] be reflected in 
each decision.”370 Other Senators feared that a seven-member Board 
would become “unwieldy.”371 These Senators believed that a large 
Board would “interfere with efficient administration, without 
any . . . compensating advantage.”372 Instead, they argued that 
increased appropriations would allow the Board to focus on deciding 
cases, rather than worrying about its administrative duties.373 
The House voiced a similar desire for more deliberative 
adjudication and less administration.374 In fact, the House’s initial bill 
did not expand the Board at all; instead, the bill separated the Board’s 
administrative and adjudicative functions.375 The House believed that 
the Board’s administrative duties had caused the Board to become lazy 
in its decision-making.376 Specifically, the House thought that the 
Board had become too reliant on trial examiners, often deferring to 
their decisions.377 Therefore, the House sought a purely adjudicative 
Board, which would focus almost exclusively on deciding cases.378 
                                                 
368 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
369 H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 5 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) (printing initial joint 
resolution). 
370 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 9 (1947). 
371 S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (1947) (Senate minority report). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 6 (1947). 
375 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. §§ 3–4 (1st Sess. 1947). 
376 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 6. 
377 Id. at 25. 
378 Id. at 6. 
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Despite congressional concern about the Board’s adjudicative 
procedures, the Circuits have virtually ignored the impact of these 
concerns on Section 3(b).379 However, the legislative history suggests 
that the Taft-Hartley Act intended to create a deliberative judicial 
body, like an appellate court.380 This intent is also reflected in the Taft-
Hartley Act’s amendments, as they allow three-member panels.381 
Presumably, Congress believed three-member panels would have 
enough divergent views to mitigate their concerns. While the two-
member quorum provision seems to be in conflict with Congress’ 
intent, Section 3(b) can be narrowly read to allow two-member panels 
only when the third member is temporarily disabled. This narrow 
reading is consistent with Photo-Sonics, where the Ninth Circuit held 
that a two-member panel could act after a third-member resigned.382 
The Circuits have cited Photo-Sonics for the proposition that a panel 
may act so long as the Board’s initial delegation includes three 
members,383 but this reading overstates the case’s holding and the 
quorum provision’s effect.384 Photo-Sonic involved an unforeseen 
resignation, unlike the pending expiration in the current line of 
cases.385 Thus, in contrast to the current problem, the case did not 
involve actual intent to delegate authority to a two-member panel.386 
                                                 
379 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457) (dismissing 
concerns about the Board’s judiciousness as a minor concern to Congress). 
380 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 6. 
381 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 3, 61 Stat. 136, 
139 (1947). 
382 Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1982) (comparing 
Section 3(b) to federal court of appeals where three-member panels have issued 
opinions after a third member died or became ill). 
383 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 847. 
384 Photo-Sonics, 687 F.2d at 122 (holding that “since all three [panel] 
members concurred in the decision, we need not determine whether [the panel 
member’s] resignation precluded his participation in the Board’s decision” issued 
after the panel member’s resignation). 
385 Id. 
386 Id. 
 264
44
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
And again, the quorum provision cannot be read to save an initially 
unlawful delegation. 
In sum, Section 3(b) fails to indicate whether the Board can 
delegate its authority to what is effectively a two-member panel. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should proceed to Chevron step-two, 
where they must determine whether the Board’s interpretation is 
reasonable.387 Here, the Board interprets Section 3(b) as allowing the 
Board to delegate its power to a three-member panel, even when the 
Board knows the panel will operate with two members.388 Thus, the 
Supreme Court will have to determine whether Section 3(b) can be 
reasonably interpreted to allow this result.  
Based on the legal reasoning applied in the Circuits,389 Section 
3(b)’s language can easily bear the Board’s interpretation. Moreover, 
Chevron deference applies even though Section 3(b) can also be 
interpreted as requiring an intended three-member panel.390 In fact, 
Chevron deference only requires a reasonable interpretation and not 
the best interpretation.391 Either way, the Board’s interpretation is 
reasonable, and thus the Supreme Court should uphold the Board’s 
delegation. 
 
2.  Panel Actions when the Board Has Only Two Total Members 
 
The second issue presents a different question: can a panel 
continue deciding cases when the Board loses its three-member 
quorum?392 Again, the Supreme Court must first determine whether 
                                                 
387 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
388 See generally New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
389 See, e.g., id. at 845–47. 
390 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not conclude that the 
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold 
the construction.”). 
391 See id. 
392 Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 420 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Congress has explicitly answered the question.393 To determine 
Congress’ intent, the Circuits will look to Section 3(b)’s language and 
legislative history.394 So far, the two Circuits that have addressed this 
issue, the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit, have reached different 
conclusions.395 However, these Circuits did not completely disagree 
about Section 3(b)’s interpretation.396 Both Circuits agree that the 
Board’s three-member quorum requirement must be satisfied before 
the Board can act.397 Specifically, Section 3(b) states that “three 
members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the 
Board.”398 As both Circuits noted, the Board must have at least three 
members to conduct Board business.399 Otherwise, the quorum 
provision’s “at all times” language would be rendered inoperative.400 
The D.C. Circuit also reasoned that Section 3(b)’s Board and panel 
quorum provisions operate independently.401 According to the D.C. 
Circuit, the panel’s two-member quorum cannot be substituted for the 
Board’s three-member quorum.402 
But Section 3(b)’s plain language does not answer the question 
presented. The issue is not whether the Board can act as a two-member 
Board; in fact, both Circuits agree that the Board cannot act with two 
                                                 
393 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
394 Id. at 843–45. 
395 Compare Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 
469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (interpreting Section 3(b) as removing the panel’s 
authority to act when the Board cannot satisfy its quorum requirement), with Snell 
Island, 568 F.3d at 420 (interpreting Section 3(b) as allowing the panel to act despite 
the Board failing to meet its quorum requirement). 
396 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 420 (noting that the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
Section 3(b) is also reasonable). 
397  Id. (agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that the Board cannot act without three 
members). 
398 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
399 Id. 
400 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. 
401 Id. at 472–73. 
402 See id. 
 266
46
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
members.403 Instead, the more precise question is whether the two-
member panel can act after the Board loses its quorum.404 In other 
words, does Section 3(b) allow panels to operate completely 
independent from the Board? The D.C. Circuit answered this narrower 
question by consulting traditional agency doctrines.405 The D.C. 
Circuit reasoned that a panel is the Board’s agent, so that the panel’s 
agency ceases the moment the Board loses its quorum.406  
Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit did not consider 
traditional agency doctrine.407 Instead, the Second Circuit attempted to 
the resolve Section 3(b)’s ambiguity by looking at the Taft-Hartley 
Act’s legislative history.408 However, the Taft-Hartley Act’s legislative 
history is inconclusive.409 As the Second Circuit noted, some Senators 
wanted to increase the Board’s decision-making capacity through 
increased membership.410 Yet, Congress did not amend Section 3(b) to 
allow seven members; instead, Congress only expanded the Board to 
five members.411 In fact, this change is more consistent with the 
Senate Minority Report and the House’s initial bill.412 The Senate 
Minority Report raised concerns that a seven-member Board would be 
too “unwieldy.”413 Similarly, the House believed that the Board’s 
efficiency could be improved by simply separating the Board’s 
adjudicative and administrative functions.414 The Senate Minority 
                                                 
403 Compare Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472, with Snell Island, 568 
F.3d at 420. 
404 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 420. 
405 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 473. 
406 Id. 
407 Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 420. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. at 423. 
410 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947). 
411 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 3, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947). 
412 Compare S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (1947) (Senate minority report), 
with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 1947). 
413 S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (Senate minority report). 
414 H.R. 3020 at § 3–4. 
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Report and the House essentially argued that a smaller, purely 
adjudicative Board would: (1) be able to decide more cases; and (2) 
make more judicious decisions.415 
Unfortunately, neither purpose offers a clear resolution to the 
question presented. While Congress wanted more efficient case 
resolution, the Board is concerned with its authority to hear cases.416 
That is to say, the Board advocates efficiency by allowing case 
resolution with low membership, while the legislative history 
advocates efficiency by expanding membership and segregating 
responsibilities.417 These two different types of efficiency are easily 
distinguishable, and thus they should not be equated with one another. 
In fact, when Section 3(b)’s purpose is broadly defined to include all 
efficient outcomes, the definition becomes overinclusive. For example, 
a broad definition of efficiency would support Board members acting 
individually, as this arrangement would clearly allow the Board to 
resolve more cases. However, Section 3(b) clearly prohibits Board 
members from acting individually.418 
Congress’ concern about judicious decision-making also fails to 
resolve the issue. Congress wanted the Board to act like an appellate 
court, with divergent views and deliberative decision-making.419 
Section 3(b) suggests that Congress thought three members offered a 
number sufficient to meet their concerns.420 However, the panel’s two-
member quorum provision conflicts with this reading.421 To resolve 
this conflict, the quorum provision can be read narrowly. That is to 
say, if the panel quorum provision only allows two-member panels 
when a third member is temporarily disabled, then less-deliberative 
                                                 
415 S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (Senate minority report); H.R. REP. No. 80-
245, at 6 (1947). 
416 New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
417 See id. 
418 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
419 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 9 (1947). 
420 Section 3(b) allows the Board to form three-member panels and to act with 
a three-member quorum. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 3(b). 
421 Id. 
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decisions will rarely occur. This narrow reading is also consistent with 
Section 3(b)’s three-member Board quorum requirement.422 
Nevertheless, Congress’ desire to create a purely adjudicative Board 
does not precisely answer whether a two-member panel can operate 
when the Board loses its quorum. 
Because Section 3(b) is ambiguous, the Supreme Court must 
determine whether the Board’s interpretation is reasonable.423 
According to the Board, Section 3(b) allows a panel to decide cases 
even when the Board has only two members.424 In Snell Island, the 
Second Circuit correctly applied Chevron step-two to this precise 
question.425 As the Second Circuit reasoned, the Board’s interpretation 
is reasonable because the Taft-Hartley Act’s “animating purpose” was 
to increase the Board’s overall efficiency.426 The Second Circuit also 
correctly noted that the Board’s interpretation is not necessarily the 
only or best interpretation.427 Instead, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the D.C. Circuit’s opposite interpretation in Laurel Baye 
Healthcare was also a reasonable interpretation.428 Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit properly deferred to the Board’s interpretation, thus 
allowing the two-member panel to continue to act.429 In sum, the 
Supreme Court should uphold the two-member panel’s decision-
making authority, despite the Board’s inability to quorum. 
                                                 
422 Id. 
423 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
424 See generally Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 420 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
425 Id. at 423–24. 
426 Id. at 423. 
427 Id. at 424. 
428 Id. 
429 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in New Process Steel demonstrates 
the current uncertainty surrounding Section 3(b).430 Despite 
interpreting Section 3(b) to allow the Board’s initial delegation,431 the 
Seventh Circuit’s legal reasoning is unsatisfying. A closer reading of 
Section 3(b)’s language and legislative history shows that Section 3(b) 
does not conclusively support the Seventh Circuit’s holding. 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has yet to determine whether the two-
member panel can decide cases while the Board does not have a three-
member quorum.432 Consequently, whether the panel is acting 
lawfully remains unresolved in the Seventh Circuit, at least until the
second issue is addressed or the Supreme Court offers its concl
 
usion. 
                                                
In spite of Section 3(b)’s ambiguity, Chevron allows the Supreme 
Court to preserve the Board’s authority to decide cases while also 
creating a stable legal framework. Although Chevron deference does 
not resolve Section 3(b)’s ambiguity, Chevron allows the Board to 
make the ultimate determination.433 However, Chevron does not give 
unlimited deference to the agency; instead, the agency must offer a 
reasonable interpretation.434 By deferring to the Board’s reasonable 
interpretation, the Supreme Court can reach an acceptable outcome 
without having to make a conclusive interpretation based on 
inconclusive evidence. In doing so, the Board can consider not only 
Section 3(b)’s language and legislative history, but also the Board’s 
desire to continue operating. If Congress disagrees with the Board’s 
interpretation, then Congress can amend Section 3(b) to resolve the 
 
430 See generally 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 
(U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
431 Id. at 846–47. 
432 See id. at 846. 
433 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
434 Id. 
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ambiguity.435 Thus, Chevron deference allows the legislative and 
executive branches to make the policy determination. In this way, 
Chevron provides a legal framework that both embraces Section 3(b)’s 
ambiguity and creates a satisfying outcome. 
 
                                                 
435 See id. 
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